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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE GORDIAN KNOT: ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT TO ETHNIC-BASED "RESISTANCE" MOVEMENTS

BY

COLONEL JAMES H. COFFMAN JR.
United States Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 2002
Senior Service Fellow

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

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by

Colonel James H. Coffman Jr
U. S. Army

Doctor Richard H. Shultz, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Colonel Eugene L. Thompson, U.S. Army War College
Project Advisors

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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Ethnic conflict is a Post-Cold War issue plaguing many states as the international system moves towards a "New World Order." Despite the importance of ethnic-based violence and neo-nationalistic social revolutions, current conflict theories do not adequately explain the fundamental dynamics of ethnic conflict or provide clear prescriptive policy guidance. This research project articulates a model that describes, explains, and prescribes ethnic conflict. First, it provides a method to objectively examine and describe the fundamentals of ethnic-based conflicts. Second, the paradigm provides decision makers with important prescriptions for foreign and domestic policies *vis-à-vis* ethnic conflict. To accomplish this goal, the research paper is divided into three main sections. Section one outlines the Political Ethnicity Theory. This four-part paradigm provides a simple, yet powerful, theoretical tool for analyzing ethnic conflict. Section two applies the theory to two case studies: Nicaragua and Yugoslavia-Kosovo. Section three applies the conclusions drawn to guide policy decisions at both the international and domestic level.

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This paper is the result of the author's Senior Service College Fellowship with the International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. This paper is also a continuation and refinement of initial research into ethnic conflict that I began in 1992 at the Naval Postgraduate School. While many historic global and political changes have occurred in the ten years since I first began to seriously study ethnic conflict, the fundamental causes of ethnic conflict have not.

I am deeply indebted to the staff and faculty of the International Security Studies Program for their assistance and the academic encouragement that they gave me throughout the Fellowship. Professors Richard Shultz and Robert Pfaltzgraff challenged me to critically think about issues that are often laden with emotion. Hopefully, their academic mentorship is reflected in this paper.

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Ethnic Conflict. The name alone conjures forth CNN-provided visions of angry camouflaged youths with guns, crying old women with dead children, streams of refugees with no hope, United States Marines buried under tons of concrete, land mine-produced multiple amputees, and illegal covert funding. Mass media satellite links and facsimile machines provide twenty-four hour information from around our "global city"[1] and focus our attention on strife in regions that we previously ignored. The "New World Disorder" brings with it quantum social changes, often accompanied by armed violence.[2]

Despite recent media attention, ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon. Ethnic strife has plagued political, economic, and social interaction since primeval ethnic consciousness emerged hundreds, if not thousands, of years ago. The contemporary issue, however, is the politically mobilized, operationally organizing aspects of ethnicity. What is most important, the hyper-nationalistic and transnational aspects of these conflicts portend severe consequences in several ethnically heterogeneous states.[3]

In his book *Revolutionary Change*, Chalmers Johnson states "Revolution is social change."[4] While revolutions may be social changes, they are more importantly political changes. Political realities are, after all, a manifestation of the socio-economic environment. Many of today's political changes have taken on ethnic characteristics that reflect a virtual explosion of intense nationalism.[5]

During the Twentieth Century, there have been at least three distinct periods of nationalistic movements: Post World War I, Post World War II/Colonialism, Post Former Soviet Union (Figure 1). These nationalistic movements either created new states or saw the independence of historically distinct states.

Unfortunately, many of these nationalistic movements did not create ethnically homogeneous states. Instead, ethnically heterogeneous states experienced dynamic tensions that often led to violent conflicts between competing communal groups. Using code phrases like *self-determination, freedom, independence, ethnic cleansing*, and *homeland*, the leaders of ethnic movements mobilized their constituents to galvanize nationalism with political objectives.

It is this operational aspect of ethnicity based on primordial ties that is revolutionary and potentially explosive. Almost inevitably, ethnic conflict, born from endemic nationalistic movements, spawns armed "resistance" movements. The question facing U.S. policy makers is provocative: when should the United States support ethnic-based "resistance" movements?



FIGURE 1. 20TH CENTURY NATIONALISM

Objectives. This Strategic Research Paper has two fundamental objectives. The first objective explains the dynamics of ethnic conflict using a combination of theory development and case study analysis. This exploration demonstrates how the primordial aspects of ethnicity translate into an operational and political reality. Further, political ethnicity theory examines the transformation of ethnic group political objectives into conflict with other ethnic groups and the government. Finally, government strategies for conflict resolution and the effects these strategies have on politically mobilized ethnic groups are discussed. This multi-variable paradigm, or political ethnicity theory, is a systematic approach to understanding the dynamics of ethnic conflict as a contemporary issue.[6] It does little good, however, to provide an analytical paradigm if that model does not assist the decision making process.

The second objective examines the United States policy implications associated with ethnic conflict with an emphasis on support of ethnic-based "resistance" movements using political ethnicity theory. Other issues of state-to-state deterrence, compellence, and crisis management are beyond the scope of this paper. As a contemporary issue facing decision makers, ethnic conflict demands attention. Therefore, this Strategic Research Paper suggests guidance for U.S. policy makers *vis-à-vis* ethnic-based "resistance" movements. Although it may be somewhat beyond the basic scope of this paper, there are some additional tantalizing suggestions for U.S. policy of support for other than ethnic-based "resistance" movements.

POLITICAL ETHNICITY THEORY

Any analysis of how governments respond to ethnic conflict must be divided into at least two levels: the international system and state level. There are, however, several immediate level of analysis difficulties with using prevalent crisis management and conflict resolution theories.[7] The political ethnicity theory attempts to correct the difficulties of other analytical methods.

First, ethnic groups are non-state actors. Although at times they are organized, control territory, and display some common traits of a state, the international community seldom recognizes ethnic groups as having state status.[8] Second, political economy and political development theories emphasize a single variable as the primary source of conflict. This emphasis not only discounts other factors but also significantly restricts analytical efforts. Third, cultural anthropology provides descriptive analysis of distinct groups of people but does not address conflict.

Political ethnicity theory is a hybrid of both conflict analysis and descriptive theories. The synthesis of conflict analysis and descriptive theory provides a comprehensive picture and illustrates the vast range of dynamic variables that ethnic conflicts revolve around. Political ethnicity theory explains ethnic conflict using a combination of other theories with ethnicity as a skeletal basis. The following discussion outlines the four components of political ethnicity theory: ethnic group identification, sources of ethnic conflict, ethnic group goals, and government responses. The two case studies (Nicaragua and Yugoslavia-Kosovo) illustrate the practical application of political ethnicity theory to contemporary ethnic conflicts. The Nicaragua (Cold War) and Yugoslavia-Kosovo (Post Cold War) case studies were selected as representative of two distinct historical periods.

ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION

Any discussion of ethnic groups must begin with a definition of what comprises ethnicity.[9] The components of ethnicity can be divided between major and minor determinants (Table 1). The combination of the various determinant variables, major and minor, is the calculus that differentiates ethnic groups. This approach to ethnic group definition is a blend of social and natural science. Major determinants (language, religion, genetics) are unique identity markers. These ethnic variables are explicit enough that they can, on a macro level, define and differentiate one ethnic group from others. Minor determinants (geography, culture, history, economy) are not unique identity markers and do not define an ethnic group by themselves. However, minor determinants add depth, reinforce, and enhance ethnic group definitions and differentials based on the major determinants.

Components of Identification	Sub-Components of Identification
Major Determinants	Language, Religion, Genetics
Minor Determinants	Geography, Culture, History, Economy

TABLE 1. ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION COMPONENTS

Major Determinants

There are three major determinant factors in ethnic group definition: language, religion, and genetics. Language is perhaps the most important determinant of ethnic group identity.[10] If nothing else, language decides the basic framework in which people describe and view their natural environment.[11] It becomes the filter of interpretation and affinity with other human beings. It is the cognitive elements of thought, emotion, and expression that attenuate perceptions of the physical environment. Moreover, people feel a natural affinity and identification with others who speak a common language. Common language allows them to communicate freely and establish a cognitive bond. As a cognitive bond, language is the medium people use to express shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, and knowledge.

Religion is another important determinant in ethnic affiliation. It is the spiritual and moral influence in an ethnic group's identity based on their perceived relationship with a supernatural entity. Religious norms shape the way individuals within ethnic groups interact with other members of society. In some religions, spiritual laws permeate all aspects of an ethnic group's distinctiveness. Although religious standards are often codified, they are normally used to describe acceptable social behavior. Finally, religion can influence education within an ethnic group. New ideas that conflict with existing religious tenants are often considered sacrilegious and rejected.

The last major determinant in ethnic classification is genetics.[12] Skin color, body type, and facial features are the most visible symbols of ethnic group affiliation. The classification of ethnic groups based on distinctive genetics ranges from biological to legal definitions. In a microanalysis, genetics is only a somatic birth right definition. In a macro-analysis, genetics forms the basis for many formal, legal descriptions of ethnic groups. Like language, common genetic features tend to promote affinity within an ethnic group.

Minor Determinants

There are four minor determinant elements: geography, culture, history, and economy. Geography contributes to ethnic group affiliation when it promotes a sense of isolation from other

groups. Groups that are physically separated from other human beings take on unique characteristics and patterns of behavior. They view other people from beyond their physical boundaries as outsiders who do not share the same values. Isolation alienates ethnic groups from other people and intensifies local customs without infusion of new ideas.

Culture is usually incorrectly expressed as the religion and language of an ethnic group. Although similar to these major determinants, culture is the outward manifestation of the combination of an ethnic group's attitudes, beliefs, norms, values, aesthetics and lifestyles.[13] Ethnic groups maintain and emphasize cultural traditions to promote uniqueness. This emphasis helps one ethnic group to maintain an individual identity that is different from other ethnic groups that share common determinants.

Another minor ethnic determinant is history. Like culture, the written and oral history of an ethnic group provides them with a feeling of uniqueness. Their collective experiences as a group divides them from other people who otherwise share many similar ethnic determinants. This natural affiliation is greatly enhanced when history is skewed to emphasize the importance of a particular ethnic group.

The final minor determinant, economy, consists of economic patterns that stratify societies into functional ethnic groups.[14] In communities where the division of labor is linked to social class, ethnic group stratification is even more important. Peasants are viewed differently than factory workers; artisans are separate from unskilled laborers; professionals are divided from bureaucrats. Functionally segrégated societies founded on traditional and legal distinctions can be explosive. Class distinction is an extreme form of socio-economic ethnic group identification.

The combination of the major and minor determinants, however, is not the final resolution that defines ethnicity. People belong to one ethnic group or another by merely believing that they do. In many respects, therefore, ethnicity is self-defining.[15]

SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

All heterogeneous societies and states experience a constant dynamic tension between competing ethnic groups. The primordial source of this ethnic conflict is the struggle for power. The quintessential and purest aspiration of ethnic conflict is redistribution of power within a society. Although there are many different ways this societal friction manifests itself, peacefully or violently, the basic impetus of an ethnic group in conflict is to maintain or increase their relative power. In a socio-economic sense, ethnic groups compete for scarce resources. In a political sense, they compete for authority.[16]

Ethnic groups in conflict direct their competitive struggle toward two distinct opponents: the government and other ethnic groups (Table 2). Although the root cause of the confrontation with the prevailing government or other ethnic groups is still based on power, the two categories of conflict can be further refined into traditional variables of political, social, and economic catalysts. These subdivisions are not mutually exclusive and all ethnic strife involves multiple, reinforcing reasons for conflict.

Categories of Conflict	Sub-categories of Conflict
Governmental	Ethnic preference; social/political mobilization
Inter-ethnic group	Class; ethnic chauvinism; racism; survival

TABLE 2. CATEGORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

Conflicts with the Government

Ethnic group conflicts with the government have two ingredients: ethnic preference and inadequate institutions to handle social/political mobilization. Many states have public policies or laws that favor one ethnic group over another. The most insidious evidence of preferential treatment is government sponsored ethnic discrimination in the areas of public service, education, political parties, housing, and jobs.[17] The "politics of dominance"[18] alienates and disenfranchises disadvantaged ethnic groups by denying them equal or fair access to economic resources and political institutions. Rebellion, revolt, or social revolution is the natural result.

Ethnic groups are not inherently political.[19] But, strong ethnic leaders can mobilize ethnic groups when governments fail to meet "minimum expectations."[20] Mobilized ethnic groups place a tremendous strain on the structures of government, especially in societies with unresponsive or underdeveloped institutions.[21] The net result is the same frustration found in societies with preferential policies. Directed political activism provides an outlet for these frustrations. If demands are not met, there is potential for political instability and social revolution. Thus, without sufficient institutional recourse to diffuse socioeconomic and political frustrations, mobilized ethnic groups are inevitably propelled into conflict with the government.

Conflicts with Other Ethnic Groups

Class becomes an issue in stratified societies when mobility opportunities are limited or restricted by ethnic identity.[22] Incipient antagonism results when the lower class believes that the

Class becomes an issue in stratified societies when mobility opportunities are limited or restricted by ethnic identity.[22] Incipient antagonism results when the lower class believes that the upper class is responsible for this suppression of opportunities for upward mobility. The natural objects of their resentment, anger, and hostility are any or all of the higher-class ethnic groups. Violence and belligerence occur when there are no legitimate political or economic outlets for the underprivileged and disadvantaged ethnic groups' rage and fury.

While the confrontation rhetoric of ethnic group leaders normally speaks of specific inequalities in socio-economic and power distribution, the subliminal message is usually, if not always, a comparison of human net worth. Ethnic chauvinism and racism are simply different degrees of promoting the predominance of one ethnic group based solely on its ethnicity. This is the most invidious and dangerous element of ethnic conflict. People are capable of tremendous atrocities when they believe that the object of their violence is subhuman or innately inferior. This moral disengagement is common when ethnic groups resort to terrorism to achieve their socioeconomic and political goals.[23]

Finally, ethnic groups do not voluntarily disappear. One of the most powerful human emotions is survival. The fear of extinction is a powerful motivation for ethnic groups to maintain their ethnicity. They will forcibly resist assimilation by other ethnic groups even when resistance is prejudicial to upward mobility or advancement. Although individuals may temporarily submerge their ethnicity to gain an advantage in a stratified society, they never divorce themselves completely from their ethnic affiliation.[24] This affiliation remains submerged just below the surface and can quickly emerge when affronted by a different ethnic group.

DEFINING ETHNIC GROUP GOALS

Ethnic movements as social revolutions translate the elements of governmental and inter-ethnic group conflict into specific goals. Ethnic group goals are inherently attempts to gain political, social, and concomitant economic power. The leaders of nationalistic movements engaged in power struggles appeal to ethnic group identity to achieve a communal consensus that promotes and is consistent with their ideological goals, desires, and objectives. This dynamic shift from primordial to operational ethnicity, directed by ethnic group and communal leaders, is essential to understanding political ethnicity. It is also possible that there will not be communal consensus. Different factions within an ethnic group may have radically different goals creating dynamic tensions well beyond those with other ethnic groups or with the government.

Overall, ethnic group goals can be divided into three basic types: separatist, integrationist, and ethnocratist (Table 3).[25] Each category of movement is further subdivided based on the political

Type Movement	Political Goals	Examples
Separatist	Autonomy	Basque; Kurds; Kosovo
	Secession	Croatia; Slovenia; Chechnya
Integrationist	Irredentism	Kosovo; Nagarno-Karabahk; Northern Ireland
	Congregation (Diaspora)	Jews (Israel); Palestinians
Ethnocratist	Equality	Lebanon; Nicaragua; South Africa
	Dominance	Uganda; Rwanda

TABLE 3. TYPOLOGY OF ETHNIC GROUP MOVEMENTS

Separatist

Separatist movements involve a consolidation of political power in a region defined by a homogeneous or dominant ethnic group. These movements are subdivided based on two distinct political goals. Autonomists desire a region within an existing state that allows them political determinism. Conversely, secessionists desire to establish a completely new and distinct political entity or nation-state.

Integrationist

Integration movements are also subdivided into two political goals. Irredentist aims are redefinition of political boundaries based on ethnic identity. This involves consolidating an ethnic group that has been artificially separated by state boundaries. Often, these boundaries were arbitrary decisions of colonial powers or other imperialistic actions. Congregation, on the other hand, results from the Diaspora of an ethnic group. Simply stated, it is the "search for a homeland." Several ethnic groups have been forcibly uprooted from their traditional geographical locations and disbursed around the world. While retaining an ethnic identity, their political goal is to establish a homeland where all of the refugees can consolidate and form a homogeneous society. This can be within the geographical boundaries of an existing state or by creation of a new one.

Ethnocratist

Many societies have laws and political systems that grant special status to certain ethnic groups at the expense of others. Ethnocratic movements involve renegotiation of these existing preferential policies. Desired political changes can follow one of two paths. Some movements merely want political equality for their ethnic group. Other, more radical movements, attempt to displace the authority of the ruling ethnic group and replace the government with one dominated by their own ethnic group.

GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS

Ethnic conflict is both political and social revolution. Ethnic groups engaged in revolution invoke many governmental responses. Although the essence of government action is always power diffusion, specific strategies fall into two broad categories: strategies of accommodation and strategies of containment (Table 4). Similarly, Huntington divides governments into two categories, civic and praetorian.[27] While he argues that specific polices or strategies of power diffusion are dependent variables based on the relative degree of institutionalization in the affected society, the essential division is between accommodation and containment of political and social mobilization.

J. Philip Rogers' discussion of crisis bargaining codes is extremely appropriate for ethnic conflict.[28] The entire point of his argument is that, in a crisis, leaders have different operational codes that drive their behavior. The same is true between ethnic groups because of the cultural basis of their operational codes. As each group attempts to deter or compel, negotiate or coerce, ethnic biases shape the parameters of their behavior. The potential for misperception is obvious and all too often comes to fruition.[29]

Ethnic conflict is obviously not always violent. Within a multi-ethnic society, political, social, and economic competition along ethnic lines can proceed peacefully. This is common in well-developed, pluralistic societies. However, a catalytic event can quickly transform peacetime competition into armed violence.

State Strategy	State Actions
Accommodation	Confederation; autonomy; federalism; multi-cultural assimilation; proportional representation
Containment	Internment; forced relocation; expulsion; deportation; attrition

TABLE 4. GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS[30]

Strategies of Accommodation

Democratic regimes and governments generally respond to ethnic conflict with strategies of accommodation. The general goal of these strategies is to peacefully resolve ethnic conflict before it escalates to violence. These strategies involve bargaining, compromise and consensus as the central government attempts to deter armed violence by an ethnic group through conciliation and negotiated settlements rather than the threat of violence.[31] However, since the rebellious ethnic group is nearly always the weaker party, there is still an implied threat. Nonetheless, this strategy is particularly effective at diffusing violent ethnic conflict since it concedes to the political (and often socio-economic) goals of the rebelling ethnic groups. Thus, the state under siege by an ethnic uprising defends itself through artful negotiations.

Strategies of Containment

Unlike democratic or civic political systems, autocratic, totalitarian, or praetorian regimes and governments more often invoke strategies of containment. These strategies always involve a strong element of forceful deterrence and coercive compellence as the state actions attempts behavior modification. Ethnic groups are coerced into acceptable actions through punishment. This is brutal power in raw form. However, as stated earlier, the survival instinct is extremely powerful and the net effect of excessive suppression is a prolongation of ethnic conflict rather than early termination.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union actively suppressed selected national identities and nationalism.[32] The Soviets also consciously and conspicuously manipulated ethnic groups to achieve their political objectives not only within the USSR but also within their sphere of influence. Other Communist-inspired governments, recognizing the inherent theoretical conflict between Marxism and nationalism, followed policies similar to the USSR. Thus, while many ethnic groups

were beginning to develop a sense of national identity at the beginning of the 20th Century, others groups were suppressed. The Soviet Union no longer exists, but the legacy and methodology of deliberate suppression of nationalism and ethnic identity remains.

HYPOTHESES

Although political ethnicity theory generates several possible hypotheses about violent ethnic-based conflict, only three are used within this Strategic Research Paper. First, government strategies of containment are the primary causes of violent ethnic conflict. The genesis for this hypothesis rests with the issue of survival. Government strategies of containment threaten ethnic groups in the most basic sense. It is logical, therefore, that ethnic and communal groups faced with repressive government policies that they perceive to be life threatening will respond violently.

Second, the presence of transnational ethnic groups increases the level of armed violence. Transnational ethnic groups enjoy an escape valve that single state ethnic groups do not - external support. As transnational groups, some communal groups can appeal to outside sources of support for their struggle against a government. This immediately escalates the scope of a conflict and the intensity of the ethnic conflict.

Third, horizontally stratified ethnic societies are more prone to violent ethnic conflict. Stratified societies that reinforce the ethnic differences through the distribution of political, social, and economic power are much less likely to peacefully resolve their conflicts. This conflict factor is additive to others and increases the level of violence.

The final hypothesis examined in the case studies deals with U.S. support of ethnic-based "resistance" movements: U.S. supports ethnic-based "resistance" movements when the goals of the movement are compatible with U.S. objectives. This assumes that there is an existing ethnic-based conflict and that the United States has an expressed interest in that conflict.

The two case studies, Nicaragua and Yugoslavia-Kosovo, were specifically selected to examine these four hypotheses during the two decades spanning the end of the Cold War. This time period, nearly contemporary for the two case studies, allows for an interesting and instructive comparison of ethnic conflicts relative to U.S. strategic interests.

CASE STUDY: NICARAGUA

Contras. While a great deal has been written about the anti-Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, very little deals with the ethnic dimensions of the struggle. The struggles on the West and East coast of Nicaragua represented two distinct movements despite their common designation in news reports as *Contras*. The Western movement was mostly a political struggle; the Eastern movement was a struggle over ethnic freedom for the Indians.



FIGURE 2. NICARAGUA MAP[33]

ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION (NICARAGUA)

There are four major geneses of peoples that inhabit the modern political state of Nicaragua: Mestizo or Landino, Indian, Creole or Blacks, and White (Table 5).[34] The Mestizo is the most numerous ethnic group with 70% of the population. The Whites with 17% are the next largest followed by the Creole at 9%. The smallest ethnic group is the Indian with only 4% of Nicaragua's population.

Within the general Indian designation, four nations live within the state of Nicaragua. The Miskito, comprising approximately 50% of the total Indian population, are the most numerous and widespread. The Rama and Sumo are equally divided at 20% percent for each nation. Lastly, the smallest nation, the Garifona, constitutes only about 10% of the total Indian population. An

analysis of the ethnic determinants of all the distinguishable ethnic groups accents some important societal cleavages and differentials.

Ethnic Group	Language	Religion	Geographic Location	% of Population
Mestizo (Landino)	Spanish	Roman Catholic	Pacific Coast; Central Highlands	70
Indian (All Groups)		Protestant (Moravian)	Atlantic Coast rural areas	4
Miskito (Costenos)	Miskito		Northeast/Central Atlantic Coast	
Rama	Miskito		Bluefields	
Sumo	Miskito		*Rio Coco* River Border	
Garifona (Carib)	English		Pearl Lagoon	
Creole Blacks	English	Protestant	Atlantic Coast urban areas	9
White	English Spanish	Protestant Roman Catholic	Scattered urban areas	17

TABLE 5. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION (NICARAGUA)[35]

Major Determinants

Language. There are three predominate languages in Nicaragua: Spanish, English, and Miskito. These three languages reinforce the general identities of the ethnic groups and differentiate them. Interestingly, the Whites speak both Spanish and English about equally depending on the region that they live in.

Spanish is the official state language as well as that of the Mestizo.[36] This predominate status reflects the Spanish conquest and consequent domination of Nicaragua. Conversely, the next largest language group is English reflecting British occupation and subjugation of the Atlantic Coast. Finally, the only native language, Miskito, is the primary language spoken by three of the

Indian nations. However, these nations also have a bilingual knowledge of English (majority) or Spanish (minority).

Religion. Religious differences further reinforce the language cleavages. The Spanish-speaking Mestizo are nearly one hundred percent Roman Catholic representing the largest religious group in Nicaragua. Approximately half the Whites are also Roman Catholic. The Protestant Moravian Church is the next largest category and is the primary religion of the Indians, Creole, and the remaining Whites. Again, the religious divisions in Nicaragua are directly attributable to Spanish and British influences on the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts.

Genetics. The most visible division of Nicaraguan society is skin color. This genetic characteristic graduates from darkest to lightest beginning with the Blacks, Creole, Indians, and Mestizo, to the Whites. Although there are no racial laws designating ethnic groups by skin color as in South Africa under apartheid, somatic differences prevail. The genetic make up of Nicaragua is not only important to ethnic group identification and but also social status. This distinction is discussed in more detail below.

Minor Determinants

The minor determinants of geography, culture, history, and economy contribute to the division of Nicaraguan society. These minor determinants of ethnicity correlate with the major determinants and significantly reinforce individual ethnic group identities.

Geography. There are three distinct geographic regions in Nicaragua: Pacific Coast, Central Highlands, and Atlantic Coast.[37] Generally, however, most observers of Nicaraguan society divide it into either the Pacific (majority population) and Atlantic Coasts (minority population) or Western and Eastern societies. Since the Central Highlands are indistinguishably linked to the western part of the country, this study will also divide Nicaragua in half. The true importance of the Central Highlands is the dividing effect they produce in Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the Atlantic Coast has never been effectively integrated into the majority Pacific Coast society. Until recently, there was not even a road or rail link between the coasts. Mostly, communication networks between the two coasts were either by sea or air.[38] This division reinforced and exacerbated the major ethnic determinants listed above as the two distinct societies developed independently.

Finally, another important aspect of this geographic division is the closely associated urban to rural relationship. The Pacific Coast population is predominantly urban and centered on the capitol city, Managua. On the Atlantic Coast there are some urban centers but the population is decidedly rural.

History. Not surprisingly, the bifurcated historical development of the Nicaraguan Pacific and Atlantic Coasts is extremely divergent.[39] While the Pacific Coast aligned itself with Roman Catholic, Spanish speaking, Spain, the Atlantic Coast Costenos linked themselves with Protestant, English speaking, Britain and the Caribbean. Without a proper appreciation for this historical alignment and separate development of the opposing coasts, the ethnic strife seems mysterious and imponderable.[40]

Economy. The economic factor of ethnicity is relevant mostly on the Atlantic Coast. There, employment and ethnic groups combine and reinforce each other. On the one hand, the Atlantic Coast Indians engage mainly in traditional resource extraction occupations such as agriculture and mining. On the other hand, the urban-centered Creoles are known for their merchant abilities and occupied the middle class positions. Finally, Whites and Mestizos own most of the larger export businesses and dominate governmental bureaucratic positions. Although economic occupations alone do not define the ethnic groups, they do assist in adding further definition to identities.

SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT (NICARAGUA)

Historical Perspective[41]

To understand the roots of ethnic conflict in Nicaragua, we must examine and understand the historical development and experience of the region. As alluded to in the discussion above, the dual nature of Nicaraguan society is the result of the divergent history of the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts. Separated by different historical developments yet unnaturally joined in a political union of a single state, the two regions remained peaceful when they did not interact. The benign neglect of the Somoza regime maintained the reality of two regions. When the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, however, the historical neglect of the Atlantic Coast ethnic groups suddenly ended. Thus, the stage was set for the latent ethnic hostilities between the West and East to emerge.[42]

Within this historical context it is important to understand that the Sandinistas were Marxist. Their ideological beliefs and practical application of Marxism formed the basis of the political, social, and economic sources of ethnic conflict.[43] In all three areas, the confrontation between the Pacific Coast Sandinista central government and the Atlantic Coast minority ethnic groups resulted in resentment, hostility, and eventual rebellion.

	Governmental	Inter-ethnic Group
Political	ALPROMISU and MISURATA made illegal	
Social	-end of native language use -secularization of education -end of native medical services	-social and class stratification
Economic	-collectivization	

TABLE 6. SOURCES OF CONFLICT (NICARAGUA)

Political

Under Somoza, the Atlantic Coast was never integrated into mainstream Nicaraguan political life.[44] While conventional wisdom would say this was a source of conflict, just the opposite was true. In fact, since there was no interference with commercial activities, the Atlantic Coast residents were content to remain aloof from the intrigue that surrounded the central government.[45]

With the end of the Somoza regime in 1979, the newly installed Sandinista regime took active measures to end the sleepy independence of the East (Table 6).[46] To facilitate their integrative goals[47], the Sandinistas outlawed the existing Indian organization ALPROMISU[48] and established a new political action organization, MISURASATA.[49] Nearly from MISURASATA's inception, Stedman Fagoth led this Indian-oriented, Sandinista-inspired umbrella association. To further the Sandinistas' attempts to gain control of the East, they installed Fagoth on a central government planning committee, The Council of Government.[50]

Initially, the relationship of MISURASATA with the central government prospered.[51] However, Fagoth eventually became disillusioned with the Sandinistas as their pervading attempts to control Nicaraguan society unfolded into actions. By 1981, the true intentions of the Sandinistas revealed themselves as the central government increasingly collectivized the Atlantic Coast agricultural production. Eventually tiring of the militant resistance by Fagoth and other MISURASATA leaders, the Sandinistas imprisoned them in February 1981 and outlawed the organization.[52] This disenfranchisement eliminated the last legal political ethnic minority organization of the ethnic minorities. After Fagoth won his release from prison, open Indian confrontation with the Sandinistas began. Instead of any further cooperation with the central government, Fagoth formed an illegal alternative organization, MISURA,[53] to oppose politically and militarily the Sandinistas' violation of Atlantic Coast Indian autonomy.

Social

There were three interconnected social factor sources of ethnic conflict in Nicaragua. First, the Sandinistas threatened the very fabric of the Indian and Creole society. The central government undertook a deliberate program to forcibly assimilate the ethnic minorities. This program included changes in education and medical services.[54] Before the Nicaraguan revolution, Moravian Church organizations provided most of these services. In particular, school curriculums were taught in native languages. However, the Sandinistas rejected this arrangement, secularized education, and introduced Spanish speaking Cuban teachers.[55] Moreover, Moravian Church clinics were closed and mostly not replaced with central government resources. This restriction of access to medical services not only secularized medical care but also threatened the basic health care availability for the Atlantic Coast minority ethnic groups.

Second, Mestizo administrators from the Pacific Coast replaced the traditional village Council of Elders.[56] While this was primarily a political action, there was also a social component. The respect for the traditional life styles of the Indians and Creoles was replaced by new, progressive dictums from the central government.

Third, Nicaragua, West and East, has always been a stratified society.[57] In the West, this stratification was socio-economic. In the East, however, the stratification was vertical based on ethnicity.[58] Whites and Europeans were at the top of the social order followed by the Indians (Miskitos being the largest group were ranked highest) and then Blacks. The Mestizo were considered the lowest ethnic group in this rank order social system. Thus, when the Sandinistas placed Mestizo administrators in positions of power above all the other ethnic groups, there was a dynamic contradiction to the existing order. While the Whites and Europeans grudgingly accepted this change, the Indians and Creoles flatly rejected the new order.

Economic

As discussed in ethnic group identification above, the Atlantic Coast Indians and Creoles were a traditional society. They did not depend on a cash economy and preferred the simpler system of trade and small subsistence farming. The Sandinistas challenged this traditional economic arrangement with forced collectivation of farming and introduction of wage labor.[59] Deprived of their traditional livelihoods, the Indians and Creoles felt threatened with extinction.[60]

ETHNIC GROUP GOALS (NICARAGUA)

Separatists

Clearly, the Indians and Creoles' goals were a return to the autonomy that they had enjoyed under the Somoza regime.[61] The pervasive intrusion by the Sandinistas into their independent cultures caused these two groups to rebel. To regain autonomy by armed violence, Stedman Fagoth recruited approximately 3,000 Indians to join the northern Contra group FDN[62] operating from bases in Honduras.[63] In the south, Eden Pastora recruited approximately 1,500 Indians and Creoles and formed another armed resistance Contra group, ARDE,[64] operating from bases in Costa Rica. Both groups had a single goal: remove Sandinista interference in the affairs of the Atlantic Coast and achieve national self-determination.[65]

Ethnocratists

The Sandinistas and their Atlantic Coast Mestizo supporter were ethnocratist. Their obvious goal was to consolidate power and dominate the entire spectrum of Eastern society. Importantly, this politics of domination[66] had a dual thrust. For the Sandinistas it was merely an attempt to capture and control the mineral resources of the East. For the Atlantic Coast Mestizo, it was an imposition of a new order that benefited them at the Indian and Creole expense.

GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS (NICARAGUA)

Central government responses to the ethnic minority separatist movements progressed in three phases. In February 1981 the Sandinistas launched Phase One with a campaign of terror and repression against the Miskito Indians. Citing security requirements, government militia[67] along with some regular soldiers raided several villages to eliminate the rebel support bases. The raids by the militia were extremely brutal and prompted several international human rights investigations.[68]

Following a modified Malaysian Solution,[69] Phase Two began in January 1982. Again citing internal security reasons, the Sandinista government evacuated Indian villages along the *Rio Coco* before a large, organized armed resistance movement could develop.[70] Several crowded relocation camps were established in the Indian region and villagers were forcibly required to live there and work Sandinista farms.[71] Anyone who resisted resettlement was labeled a counter-revolutionary and imprisoned or killed. This aided the *Contra* propaganda and further alienated the general Indian population from the Sandinista government.[72]

While Phase One and Two continued splendidly, the armed Contra Indian resistance movements had a remarkable effect on the Sandinista government. Quietly in 1985, the Interior Minister, Tomas Borge, initiated Phase Three. Negotiating with Indian leaders, Borge reached a tentative settlement of the armed struggle that recognized "some errors had been made" by the Sandinistas. This agreement also recognized the inalienable rights of the Indians, official recognition of their ethnic identity, and limited autonomy. Culminating in August 1989 with the Tela Accord, the Atlantic Coast achieved its objectives of a limited autonomous status in Nicaragua.

UNITED STATES POLICIES (NICARAGUA)

U.S. support to the Contras from 1981 to 1989 was firmly rooted in two fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy: the Monroe Doctrine and the Cold War policies of containment of communism. Beginning in 1980, the Soviet Union, through Cuban intermediaries, was providing military aid to the communist Sandinistas. This aid directly challenged U.S. vital interests in the Western Hemisphere. Not only was the Soviet Union directly interfering in the internal affairs of a country in the U.S. sphere of interest, but also the Sandinistas were using this aid to further assist communist insurgencies in El Salvador.[73] The Contras were seen by the U.S. as a means of indirectly challenging the Soviet Union interference and, if successful, preventing the spread of communism in Latin America.

The general mythology of U.S. involvement in Nicaragua during the 1980's was that the Reagan administration secretly supported the Contras against the wishes of Congress and the American people. This common belief is not completely accurate. In fact, the Reagan administration was fairly open about its fundamental policy that the Contras were deserving of U.S. support and assistance. Similarly, many members of Congress openly supported the Contras, including military aid,[74] and the U.S. Congress repeatedly passed budgets that provided aid for the Contras from 1981 – 1989.[75]

The general misperception about U.S. policy to aid the Contras really was about *method* not *intent*. On the one hand, there were U.S. officials within the Reagan administration, in particular the President himself,[76] and Congress that believed in full support to the Contras to include arms, ammunition, training, logistical support, and advice (from the Central Intelligence Agency or other appropriate agencies). [77] On the other hand, there were those within the policy making community, the public opinion shaping community, and Congress that felt the U.S. should not interfere in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and that anything other than humanitarian aid was illegal. To many observers, this conflict appeared to be inconsistent U.S. policy.[78]

This divergence over methods and the associated misunderstanding of the Reagan administration's actions in support of the Contras has been bolstered mainly by the Iran-Contra scandal. The Boland Amendments are often cited as proof that all support to the Contras was illegal. The facts dispute this assertion. The first Boland Amendment (1982) stated that funds could not be used to overthrow the Sandinista government. The second Boland Amendment (1984) restricted funds available to the CIA, DoD, or other U.S. intelligence agencies from being spent to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua without a Congressional vote. Congress continued to pass funding for humanitarian support based on the human rights violations associated with the ongoing ethnic conflict. Episodically and in spite of the Boland Amendments, the U.S. Congress also passed authorization bills that funded military aid to the Contras.[79]

It is safe to state that U.S. policy of support to the Contras was consistent with U.S. vital interests. In the final analysis, this support was effective and greatly contributed to the 1990 elections that ousted Daniel Ortega's Sandinista government.[80] The peaceful election results effectively stopped Soviet influence in Nicaragua and subsequent support to the communist insurgency in El Salvador.

CONCLUSIONS (NICARAGUA)

Most observers overlook the ethnic conflict component of the Nicaraguan counter-revolution (*Contras*). The predominate attention and analysis focuses on the sponsorship and role of the United States' support for Contras operating from bases in western Honduras (FDN). Although some attention occasionally turned to the ARDE operating from Costa Rica and FDN elements from eastern Honduras, it was mostly cursory. Like the West-East division of Nicaraguan society, these two interrelated counterrevolutionary movements were distinct. Without an understanding of the ethnic dimension of the eastern conflict, this subtle difference is lost in the overwhelming emphasis on the Western conflict. Not only were the political goals different but so were the ethnic groups.

Indeed, the political aspirations of the two groups reflected the national aspirations of Nicaragua. Eventually, the Sandinista-dominated government realized these differences and resolved them with the political reality of contemporary Nicaragua. Today, there is a tentative equality between the Mestizo groups in the west and autonomy for the Indian-dominated minority group in the East.

This balance of national aspirations must be maintained or the central government of Nicaragua risks renewed escalation and widening of the current political conflict. The current rebellious actions of hostage taking and armed violence in the West do not affect or involve the

eastern society. As long as the central government faithfully allows some degree of autonomy for the Miskito and other Indian nations, the Indians will remain neutral to the political struggle for control of the central government. If, however, radical Sandinista elements regain control of the government in Managua and reinstate previous domination policies (strategies of containment), the Atlantic Coast will rearm and resist. Considering the ideology of the Sandinistas and their historical record toward the Eastern Society, renewed ethnic conflict can only be avoided by a democratic balance within the central government that continues to respect the existing autonomy of the Atlantic Coast.

CASE STUDY: YUGOSLAVIA - KOSOVO

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). At the end of the Twentieth Century, ethnic conflict in Southeast Europe, the Balkans, seemed no different than during the Fourteenth Century. Newspapers, magazines, television, and even the Internet was flooded with horrific images of mutilated bodies slaughtered in what was described as an atavistic manifestation of age-old ethnic hatreds. Considering the relative success that Western European powers with the aid of the United States had achieved in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, it seemed unimaginable, even cruel, that once again, bloody ethnic warriors were on the march.

FIGURE 3. YUGOSLAVIA MAP[81]

ETHNIC GROUP IDENITIFCATION (YUGOSLAVIA - KOSOVO)

There are four distinct primary groups of people that live within the Republic of Yugoslavia: Serb, Albanian, Montenegrin, and Hungarian. In addition to these predominant ethnic groups, there are some minor indistinct groups, the Turks and Roma. Within Yugoslavia overall, the largest ethnic group is the Serbs at 63% of the population. The Albanians are the next largest comprising 17% followed by the Montenegrins at 5% and Hungarians with only 3%. All other ethnic groups total 13% of the Yugoslav population (Table 7).

In the Kosovo region, the most significant demographic aspect is the dramatic inverse proportionality of Serbs and Albanians compared to overall Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, the Serbs are a

mere 10% of the population while the Kosovars[82] makeup an overwhelming 90% of the population (Table 8).

Ethnic Group	Language	Religion	Geographic Location	% of Population
Serb	Serbo-Croat	Serbian Orthodox	Serbia; parts of Kosovo and Montenegro	63
Albanian	Albanian; Serbo-Croat	Sunni Muslim	Kosovo	17
Montenegrin	Serbo-Croat	Serbian Orthodox	Montenegro	5
Hungarian	Hungarian	Roman Catholic	Vojvidina	3
Turk, Roma, Other	Mixed	Varies	Scattered	13

TABLE 7. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION (YUGOSLAVIA)[83]

Ethnic Group	Language	Religion	Geographic Location	% of Population
Serb	Serbo-Croat (Cyrillic alphabet)	Serbian Orthodox	Northern border Kosovo – Serbia; major urban centers	10
Kosovar (Albanian)	Albanian (Latin alphabet)	Sunni Muslim	Throughout area	90

TABLE 8. MAJOR ETHNIC GROUP IDENTIFICATION (KOSOVO)[84]

Major Determinants

Language. There are three primary languages spoken in Yugoslavia: Serbo-Croat, Albanian, and Hungarian. These three languages reinforce ethnic group identity and correspond directly with

the distinctly associated ethnic groups. The official language of Yugoslavia is Serbo-Croat, the language of the dominant Serb and the minority Montenegrin population. The Kosovar primary language is Albanian but a large percentage of the Albanian ethnic group also speak Serbo-Croat reflecting the Serbian predominant status. The small Hungarian population speaks Hungarian but uses Serbo-Croat in official business.[85]

In the written language there is a further distinct cleavage between the ethnic groups. On the one side, the Serb, Montenegrin and Hungarians (when writing Serbo-Croat) use the Cyrillic alphabet. On the other side, the Kosovar population uses the Latin alphabet for both Albanian and Serbo-Croat. In addition to these primary languages, there are several minor languages spoken by the various, scattered ethnic groups within Yugoslavia.

Religion. Religious differences, the primary ethnic determinant, reinforces language distinction within Yugoslavia. The Serbo-Croat speaking Serbs and Montenegrins are almost universally Serbian Orthodox. Similarly, the Kosovars are predominantly Sunni Muslim with small minorities that are either Roman Catholic or Protestant. A very small number of Albanians living outside of Kosovo are Serbian Orthodox. The Hungarian ethnic group's primary religious affiliation is Roman Catholic.[86] It is along these fault lines of religious affiliation that Yugoslav ethnic identity unevenly lays.

Minor Determinants

The minor determinants of geography, culture, history, and economy, further sharpen the distinctions of Yugoslavia's population. This division is mainly between the two largest ethnic groups, the Serbs and the Kosovars.

Geography. The mountainous region of Kosovo has long separated the Albanian people living there from their Serb neighbors to the north and Albanian kin to the south. This physical separation, coupled with historical separate development, reinforces the Kosovar's belief that they are a unique and distinct ethnic group.

Culture. One of the most important cultural factors for the Kosovars that sets them apart from all other Albanian people is "the Kanun of Lek Dukagjan."[87] This code of honor and behavior is crucial to their self-identification and justification for blood feuds. This compares in cultural importance to the continuing Serbian myths generated by "The Battle of Kosovo" from 1389. "The Battle of Kosovo," enshrined in epic poetry, glorifies Serbian honor in the face of overwhelming adversities.[88] For the Kosovars and the Serbians alike, conceptions of cultural distinctions sets them apart from all other similar people and is quintessential to ethnic group identity.

History. Volumes have been written on the history of the Balkans. Inevitably, the First Balkan War, when Kosovo was ceded to Serbia in 1912, is cited for the importance of that political decision to the relationship of Kosovo to Serbia.[89] What is not usually discussed is the importance this had on the ethnic identity of Kosovars as separate from other Albanian people. Beginning with this historic event, the Albanians living in Kosovo began to develop a unique sense of an ethnic identity that, while still Albanian, was more deeply Kosovar.[90]

Economy. The economic component of ethnicity in Yugoslavia divides the urban and industrial Serbs from the clan-based, pastoral Kosovars. Again, when coupled with other determinants, this ethnic marker further distinguishes the two primary ethnic groups in Yugoslavia.

SOURCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT (YUGOLSLAVIA – KOSOVO)

Historical Background

The roots of the recent ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia's Kosovo region can be divided into two periods: the Cold War years and post Cold War. Kosovo has had a long and troublesome relationship with the Serbian dominated Yugoslavian government. During the Cold War, periods of harsh treatment following the end of World War II were replaced in the mid-60's with a "pollyanna" period of rapprochement and Kosovo autonomy in 1974 (strategies of accommodation).[91] Key to all decisions on Kosovo before 1981 was Tito.

Following Tito's death in 1981, Kosovo's semi-independent relationship with the Yugoslav central government began to erode precipitously.[92] In March 1989, Slobodan Milosevic formally declared an end to Kosovo's autonomous political status. This decision was followed by imposition of direct Serbian rule over Kosovo and was confirmed when the Serbian authorities dissolved the Kosovo assembly in 1990.[93] This last "official" act, dissolving that political body, came just as the so-called "Wars of Yugoslav Succession" began.[94]

As armed conflicts raged between Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Slovenia, at the end of the Cold War, the status of Kosovo was momentarily forgotten.[95] The Dayton Peace Accords signed in 1995 defined what remained of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro, an autonomous province of Vojvidina, and a region known as Kosovo. What was not settled at Dayton was the political status of Kosovo.[96] As Serbia imposed harsh restrictive measures on Kosovo (strategies of containment), ethnic unrest began to foment. As the Serbs continued to tighten their political, social, and economic restrictions (Table 9), ethnic-based political violence increased in Kosovo until the rest of the world could no longer ignore it. Hoping to recreate the

success of Dayton, the United States and European countries attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement in 1998 between Serbia and the Kosovars with the Rambouillet agreement.[97]

Serbian and Kosovar intransigence and rejection of the Rambouillet agreement finally forced the United Nations to issue a resolution authorizing NATO forces to engage in combat operations against Serbia. Operation ALLIED FORCE began in March 1999 and ended in a negotiated cease-fire in June 1999.[98] Operation ALLIED FORCE, however, did not settle the political status of Kosovo and it remains even today under United Nations protection – not autonomous or independent.

	Governmental	Inter-ethnic Group
Political	-ban of Albanian parties -1992 elections declared illegal -end of Autonomy	-Serbian domination of Communist Party -Serbian over-representation in Kosovo Assembly -Serbian domination of police force
Social	-ban of Albanian language -denial of higher education	-Myth of the Battle of Kosovo
Economic	-seizure of Albanian business -Albanian business ownership made illegal -denial of Albanian right to work	-Serbian over-representation in management

TABLE 9. SOURCES OF CONFLICT (YUGOSLAVIA-KOSOVO)[99]

Political

There were several political factors that contributed to difficulties between the Kosovar ethnic majority and the Serbian ethnic minority in Kosovo. One indirect challenge to the political status of the Kosovars was their degree of representation in the Kosovo Assembly. Over representation of Serbs and Montenegrins in the Communist party and the Kosovo Assembly was a continual source of irritation for the Kosovar political parties.[100] Any attempts to gain political concessions for Kosovars depended on Serb and Montenegrin agreement. Another indirect challenge was the

Serbian domination of the police force in Kosovo.[101] The police, as a visible instrument of governmental power represented the rule of the ethnic minority over the majority.

A direct challenge to independent Kosovar political life was the end of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989. While there had been a less than peaceful political relationship between Serbia and Kosovo in the post World War II years, any hopes of continuing rapprochement were crushed by the Serbian dominated vote to end autonomy.

Social

Serb Nationalism and Chauvinism. The Serbian myth of Kosovo, [102] innumerably recounted as *The Battle of Kosovo, 1389,* is often cited as one of the fundamental causes of the ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanians. Robert Kaplan, in particular, has been a leading proponent of the thesis that the Myth of Kosovo led to the recent conflagration between Serbs and Kosovars in Kosovo.[103] Noel Malcolm, an acknowledged expert on Kosovo, flatly rejects this thesis as unsubstantiated.[104] While Kaplan's argument may not be technically accurate, Malcolm's objections are too scholarly. What is crucial about this myth was not historical accuracy but Slobodan Milosevic's ability to use his power to mobilize Serbian nationalism at the expense of the Kosovars. Perceptions of the myth's reality allowed the Serbs to feel morally and culturally superior to the Kosovars. This perception of superiority not only inflamed Serb nationalism but also reinforced Serb chauvinism *vis-à-vis* the Kosovars.

The end of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 also marked the beginning of a direct Serb government sponsored assault on Kosovar social identity as Serbia eliminated Albanian language in secondary schools, Albanian language in Pristina University, Albanian language newspapers, and publicly funded Albanian language media. To aggravate this situation further, the Serbs also established a system of virtual "apartheid" that separated Kosovar and Serb students with only Serb-approved curriculums authorized. These restrictions in the education system prompted student revolts and demonstrations. Moreover, the Serbs targeted doctors and other Kosovar professionals for harassment and special treatment.[105]

Economic

During the period of increasing assaults on Kosovar political and social institutions, the overall economy of Yugoslavia suffered a significant decline. Kosovo was especially hard pressed but economic misfortunes were not equally shared between Serbs and Kosovars. The Serbs already dominated managerial positions in the Kosovo economy and took the opportunity to strengthen their positions.[106] Beginning in 1989, the Kosovars had systematically been eliminated from the

work force and job opportunities.[107] Threatened with the loss of livelihood, many of the disaffected workers joined both worker "resistance" movements and, more importantly, armed "resistance" movements of the Kosovo Liberation Movement.

ETHNIC GROUP GOALS (YUGOSLAVIA – KOSOVO)

Separatist

Autonomy. The more moderate Kosovar Albanian political leaders desired a return to autonomy. Their objective was not a free and independent Kosovo. Rather, they desired to remain politically and economically within the Yugoslavian republic but retain independent decision-making capability. Unfortunately, these moderate Kosovar leaders were marginalized by more radical elements with more ambitious agendas.

The most visible representative of the Kosovar separatist movement was Ibrahim Rugova. In 1992, nearly three years following the end of autonomy for Kosovo, Rugova was secretly elected the head of an underground Kosovar Albanian government. He had three objectives for Kosovo: prevent violence; gain international involvement in the situation; and end the legitimacy of Serbian rule.[108] Although Rugova employed a declaratory strategy of passive resistance and civil disobedience, appearing to be in favor of autonomy, his ultimate goals for Kosovo were much more ambitious. As head of the illegal Kosovar Albanian government, Rugova declared Kosovo's independence and built a completely separate state apparatus of schools, legislature, political system (with elections), and most importantly taxes.[109]

Secession. Frustrated with Rugova's strategy of passive resistance and non-compliance, more extreme Kosovar became more vocal beginning in 1997. Demanding nothing less than full independence for Kosovo, the radical elements began a grass roots campaign to gain popular support. The Kosovo Liberation Army, the armed element of the Kosovo independence movement, formed to further promote and achieve this goal. Kosovar nationalists employed rousing rhetoric to inspire the KLA to attack Serbian military and civilian targets within Kosovo beginning in the summer of 1998. In addition, radical Kosovar leaders conspired with sympathetic Albanian officials to provide safe areas within Albanian for the KLA.

In 1998, following a 5 day meeting with Slobodan Milosevic, Rugova mysteriously switched his public support from Kosovo autonomy to independence.[110] Considering the increasing Kosovar public sentiment for independence, it is difficult to determine if Rugova's new political objectives were merely political expedience or genuine. Regardless of the reason, the Kosovar Albanian independence movement, with full support of Rugova as the titular leader, became radicalized, confrontational, and violent in the summer of 1998. As the violence continued through the end of

1998, Kosovo independence resonated more and more with Kosovar refugees and displaced persons.

Ethnocratist

It is fairly clear that the Serb primary goal was domination of all aspects of life in Kosovo. Every political, social, and economic measure served to strengthen the Serb's relative power at Kosovar expense. Despite periods of some degree of equality between Serbs and Kosovars, the overall pattern was Serb domination. The most telling evidence of this domination, at least until 1999, was that the Kosovars were never allowed any independent power or decision-making authority without explicit Serb consent.

GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS (YUGOLSAVIA – KOSOVO)

Clearly the beginnings of the recent violent ethnic clash in Kosovo started with the end of Kosovo autonomy in March 1989. The question, though, is how did this change lead to violence when similar periods of "containment" in the past had not? The answer is government actions.

Government actions in the period of containment following World War II (the "Tito years") were much more benign. Limitations on political activities, social and cultural restrictions, under-representative economic opportunities, and general disenfranchisement of Kosovars caused significant anger and resentment but did not provoke violence. These inequities were not a direct threat to the Kosovars.

Initially, the end of autonomy was more of a return to the previous containment policies than new government actions. Rugova's strategy of non-violent confrontation, non-compliance, and passive resistance is indicative of the low level threat during the period 1989 – 1998.[111] 1997 marked the beginning of the change in Yugoslavian government actions. The Kosovo Liberation Army attack on Serb police marked a change in strategies for the Kosovars and a change in actions for the government.[112] As the KLA attacks increased, the government forces responded with more repressive measures. By the summer of 1998, a spiral of violence began to escalate.[113] The KLA were denounced as terrorists and Serb forces began a deliberate program of changing the demographic composition of Kosovo through a combination of arbitrary arrests, physical abuse, expulsions, forced migrations, attrition, property and business seizures, and "genocide." "Operation Horseshoe,"[114] as it was revealed and reported, was a brutal plan to expel all Kosovars from Kosovo. While a government has the right to self-defense and to protect itself against armed insurrection, "Operation Horseshoe" was a vast perversion of this right.

UNITED STATES POLICIES (YUGOSLAVIA – KOSOVO)

At best the United States policies on Kosovo before Rambouillet were uncertain, if not outright confusing. Despite adequate warnings from credible sources about the new humanitarian disaster unfolding in the Balkans, the Clinton administration continued to waiver and hedge on what actions to take. Repeated Congressional hearings[115] and public support for forceful actions went unheeded until no other viable alternative existed but armed intervention. Once the decision to intervene in Kosovo was made, the objections were clear: avert humanitarian catastrophe, preserve stability in Southeast Europe, and maintain the credibility of NATO.[116] This combination of important and humanitarian interests[117] accurately reflected U.S. requirements for intervention, but hardly matched the objectives of the Kosovars as expressed by the KLA "resistance" movement. At no time did the U.S. intimate that Kosovo independence or even autonomy was an objective of U.S. policy.

Considering the long history of difficulties the Serbs have had with Kosovo autonomy, let alone independence, it is unimaginable that the United States would have been able to support the KLA objectives even as an operational expedient. The stated U.S. goals to avert humanitarian catastrophe and preserve stability were irreconcilable with KLA objectives that were a complete anathema to the Serbs. In fact, it is safe to assert that achievement of the U.S. ultimate objectives relied on explicitly not supporting the KLA.

CONCLUSIONS (YUGOSLAVIA – KOSOVO)

Ethnic-based violence in Kosovo has been the direct result of Serbian political, social, and economic desires to dominate. This ethnocratic domination was legalized, though not legitimized, through manipulation of government policies and actions. Encouraged by initial success, the Serbs continued to increase the pressure on the Kosovars with more restrictive measures (strategies of containment). The turning point to absolute overt brutally followed some scattered KLA attacks in 1988. Whatever restraint the Serbs had felt prior to that vanished.

The change in government actions after the KLA attacks suggest that there was some KLA culpability in the ensuing ethnic violence. However, the brutal over-reaction of the Serbian government was not justifiable. The real tragedy is that the spiraling violence between competing ethnic-based political groups was harshest on the very people each side allegedly sought to protect.

More discouraging than the human tragedy in Kosovo at the height of Serb actions, 1998 – 1999, is the present situation. Although there is an uneasy peace, the political status of the Kosovars and Kosovo is not settled. Without a political settlement, there can be no lasting peace.

The end of Operation ALLIED FORCE and the ensuing occupation by United Nation peacekeeping forces merely places the hard political decisions in abeyance. The immediate sources of the ethnic conflict have been eliminated, but not the memories or visceral desires.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

ETHNIC GROUPS AND VIOLENCE

Ethnic groups are not inherently, innately, nor necessarily political or violent. While an ethnic group may have a sense of a unique identity, ethnic identity alone is not a causative ingredient of an associated violent ethnic movement. Indeed, there may be no movement at all except assimilation into a dominant ethnic group culture. Threatening government actions, however, tend to evoke a negative reaction. The effort of governments to forcibly suppress ethnic unrest assists ethnic and communal leaders in their attempts to transform subliminal ethnic identity into an operational one. This political aspect of ethnicity is the basis of the political ethnicity paradigm.

Political ethnicity theory is an extremely useful analytical tool to examine ethnic conflict. By systematically reducing ethnic conflict to its vital components, an analyst or decision maker can methodically determine root causes and subsequent viable policy options. Although it does not include every variable possible, political ethnicity theory overcomes the limitations of single variable analysis inherent in prevalent conflict theories. Moreover, it also demonstrates utility as a descriptive approach to classification of ethnic groups within states. The two illustrative case studies demonstrate the practical application of political ethnicity theory to contemporary ethnic conflicts and leads to three primary conclusions.

First, the presence of transnational ethnic groups faced with repressive government actions increases the level of ethnic conflict. This is not surprising since these groups have an outside source of support to reinforce their goals or actions. While there is violence associated with a minority ethnic group's resistance against a harsh and repressive regime (Nicaragua), this violence exponentially increases when there is a dual transnational ethnic group situation (Yugoslavia – Kosovo). In the case of Nicaragua, only the Contras were transnational. In the case of Kosovo, both of the major competing ethnic groups, the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs in Kosovo, had a support base outside of the contested area (relative transnationalism).

Second, horizontally stratified societies exacerbate inherent societal inequities. This tension increases violence when coupled with other sources of ethnic conflict but is not a primary cause of ethnic-based turmoil.

Third, government strategies towards ethnic groups do make a difference. As the case studies effectively illustrate, violent ethnic conflict is mostly associated with strategies of containment (C). As governments attempt to repress ethnic group demands for political, social, and economic power, ethnic identity is reified. Ethnic group and communal leaders are then able to translate this primordial ethnic identity into an effective operational ethnic identity in opposition to

the government. While it is certainly true that strong central governments can effectively restrain ethnic conflict with overwhelming application of force (i.e. the Former Soviet Union), this strategy of containment is a short-term solution that eventually leads to increased violence.

Strategies of accommodation (A), on the other hand, allow for political, social, and economic freedom of minority ethnic groups. These expressions tend to be peaceful and less threatening to a central government as political, social, and economic power is shared between competing ethnic groups. Thus, the basis of ethnic conflict is transmuted and diffused, eliminating the support base of ethnic and communal leaders. The overall result is that with the loss of their ethnic constituency and *raison d'ete* for ethnic-based strife, the inherent tensions of society are reduced to a manageable level of conflict. Therefore, strategies of accommodation are long-term solutions to ethnic conflict since they significantly reduce the level of violence.

Case Study	Transnational	Stratification	Government Strategy
Nicaragua	Yes	Yes	A – C - A
Yugoslavia - Kosovo	Yes	Yes	C – A – ?

TABLE 10. SUMMARY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT FACTORS

UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

The normative ideal of promoting national self-determination has shaped the foreign policy of the United States and encouraged nationalistic movements (mobilized ethnic groups) since President Wilson laid out his famous 14 Points.[118] During the Cold War, and especially the Reagan administration, government officials often spoke favorably about "freedom fighters" and the rights of oppressed people to seek "self-determination." This ideological support of "resistance" movements, however, was within the context of the overall national security strategy and "vital interests" of the United States: deterrence and containment of communism.

In the Post-Cold War, the Clinton administration began to shift emphasis from "vital interests" to "important interests" of humanitarian aid. Self-determination and "democratic enlargement" became the basis for the declarative national security strategy of the United States.[119] Formerly suppressed nationalities encouraged by these ideological ideals[120] and the history of the United States defending what they perceived to be similar movements during the Cold War, mobilized.

These new and emerging nations sought self-determination and expected the United States to support their "resistance" movements.

Case Study	U.S. Interest	Congressional Support	Presidential Support	Group Objectives Match U.S.
Nicaragua	Vital; Humanitarian	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia - Kosovo	Important; Humanitarian	Yes	Yes	No

TABLE 11. SUMMARY OF U.S. SUPPORT OF ARMED RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY

With the end of the Cold War, violent conflicts in general have become increasingly more regional in nature. Despite the horrible atrocities associated with ethnic conflicts, they do not always require intervention from states outside the affected region. Indeed, foreign involvement tends to increase the level of violence rather than mitigate or terminate it. As with any civil war, ethnic conflicts end when one of three events occurs: one belligerent party wins, all belligerent parties become too exhausted to continue, or there is a negotiated settlement equally unfavorable for all. Unfortunately, external interference prolongs ethnic conflict and prevents one of these three conditions from being met. To put it simply, ethnic conflicts eventually "burn themselves out" if competing groups are left alone.

The likelihood that violent ethnic conflict will continue in the Twenty-first Century is high. Rearrangement of national boundaries, ethnic-based governments, and disputes over ethnically divided regions continues unabated. In a narrow sense, the question is whether the United States should support ethnic-based "resistance" movements. On the surface, it appears more important that the U.S. encourage government strategies of accommodation rather than direct support to armed "resistance" movements to terminate ethnic conflict. In both case studies, it was a change in government strategies that terminated the conflict. When this change occurs internally, the results seem more lasting than when imposed from external sources.

In Nicaragua, U.S. episodic support of the *Contras* escalated the violence generating an adverse reaction from the American public and Congress. But, in the end, this support did allow the *Contras* to apply enough political pressure on the Nicaraguan government to change its policies. In this instance, U.S. support of the ethnic-based "resistance" movement had an indirect and positive effect on Nicaraguan government policies. Similarly, the U.S. and NATO direct involvement in events in Kosovo escalated the immediate violence. In contrast to the Nicaraguan case study, NATO and the U.S. succeeded in directing forcible changes in the Yugoslavian government's policies, but did not completely end the violence in Kosovo. Indeed, the armed successors of the former KLA "resistance" movement continue violent attacks on the ethnic Serb minority in Kosovo. Moreover, the status of Kosovo is indeterminate – it is neither autonomous nor independent.

However, support to armed "resistance" movements still has merit. The two case studies also indicate that when U.S. "vital interests" are involved and they match ethnic group objectives, support for a "resistance" movement is warranted and effective to cause internal policy changes. When the case is one of "important interests" but the objectives of the ethnic group do not match those of the United States, support of the armed resistance is not recommended. The defining variable for support of armed elements, therefore, is the match between U.S. vital interest objectives and the "resistance" movements' goals.

In a broader sense, the question still remains as to when is it appropriate for the United States to support armed resistance movements in general? The implication from the analysis above is that when there is a match between United States vital interests and the "resistance" movement's goals, support to an armed element is appropriate. One can conclude from this that the U.S. support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was not only predictable but also consistent with previous experience. Similarly, it is logically consistent for the United States to provide support to the Iraqi National Congress against Saddam Hussein's regime. As with Nicaragua and Afghanistan, the goals of the Iraqi National Congress resistance movement reflect the realities of U.S. vital interests in Iraq – stopping international terrorism.

WORD COUNT = 10,611

ENDNOTES

[1] The vogue term *global village* is more commonly used to describe the inter-connectivity of the modern world. I have replaced this with *global city* because it more accurately depicts the complex nature of a mutually dependent world. While a "village" is generally homogeneous, a "city" is distinctly heterogeneous. Within the confines of a multi-national city there are usually ethnic ghettos. These ethnic communities maintain distinct identities separate from the city's overall characteristic.

[2] See Ken Jowitt, *The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

[3] An excellent discussion of the transnational aspects of hyper-nationalism and regional security implications is found in Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace" in *The Cold War and After*, edited by Jean M. Lynn-Jones (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 236-240.

[4] Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 1.

[5] There are two factors that account for this exponential growth in national consciousness. First, the demise of the former Soviet Union signaled the end of an era of purposeful suppression of selected national identities. The Soviets consciously and conspicuously manipulated ethnic groups to achieve their political objectives not only within the USSR but also within their sphere of influence. Other Communist-inspired governments also recognized the inherent theoretical conflict between Marxism and nationalism. Thus, while many ethnic groups were beginning to develop a sense of national identity at the beginning of the twentieth century, others groups were suppressed. Second, mass media and information penetration promotes national consciousness. Contact with other people highlights differences. This has allowed scattered people to recognize that they share commonality with some groups and differences with others. National consciousness is fostered by inter-group relations and activities, not isolation. Third, nationalism is an artificial construction for political purposes. Political leaders invoke nationalism to mobilize a constituency. Walker Connor and Louis Snyder's cited works provide an excellent and informative in depth analysis of this phenomena. Also see Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), Harold R. Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), T. V. Sathyamurthy, *Nationalism in the Contemporary World: Political and Sociological Perspectives* (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun and Company, 1983), and Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993).

[6] Political ethnicity theory is the result of an examination of current conflict theories and sociological studies of ethnicity. It quickly became apparent that conflict theories with their predominantly single variable approach could not adequately explain the complex dimensions of ethnic conflict. Similarly, sociology, in particular cultural anthropology, only provided a description of ethnicity and human motivation factors. Obviously, to understand ethnic conflicts more fully required a multi-discipline, multi-variable approach. The political ethnicity paradigm is a multi-variable reduction and synthesis of these various disciplines into a single integrated analytical framework. As with any model, there are some variables that are either ignored or

controlled. In the case of political ethnicity, I concentrated on the factors and processes that transformed primordial ethnic identity into operational and potentially conflictive situations.

[7] For a complete discussion of levels of analysis see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[8] A notable exception to this general rule is the Palestinian Liberation Organization that received official recognition and state status with the United Nations. This previous exceptional recognition has now been further legalized by creation of the Palestinian Authority that controls the Gaza strip and portions of the West Bank (in Israel).

[9] A comprehensive discussion of each of the determinants and their role in ethnic group identity is found in *Ethnic Autonomy-Comparative Dynamics*, edited by Raymond Hall (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979). This valuable work has many contributors that examine separately the relationship between *micro-variables* and political goals of ethnic groups. The idea of distinguishing between major and minor determinants, however, is my own creation. One variable that I did not incorporate into my discussion of ethnic group identity is *patterns of domination*. However, I discuss this idea under the heading "Sources of Ethnic Conflict" in a much broader context.

[10] The importance of language to discriminate differences in ethnic group identification is confirmed in several sources found in the bibliography. The specific references are too numerous to list but the most cogent statement of the role of language in nationalism (ethnic group identification) is from Max Boehm in his 1933 contribution to the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*:

> The concept of a mother tongue has made language the source from which springs all intellectual and spiritual existence. The mother tongue represents the most suitable expression of spiritual individuality ... A people not only transmits the store of all its memories through the vocabulary of its language, but in syntax, word rhythm it finds the most faithful expression of its temperament and general emotional life. The rare cases wherein a people retained its individuality despite the loss of its language do not disprove the conviction of a people or national group that they are defending in language the very cornerstone of their national existence. The encouragement of dialect is somewhat analogous to the regionalist cult of the local homeland (235).

[11] An interesting discussion of the relationship between language and thought processes is found in John W. Berry et al *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)

[12] I prefer the word *genetics* to the more common *race*. The use of race to describe an ethnic group too often takes on a pejorative attribute that should be avoided. Having said that, however, genetic traits are the fundamental basis for racism.

[13] *Ethnic Autonomy-Comparative Dynamics*, edited by Raymond L. Hall (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), xxvi.

[14] This statement directly contradicts the view of Orlando Patterson in his book *Ethnic Chauvinism* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), 105. Although I agree that classes are economic groups, they can become default ethnic groups. This occurs when class members' primary basis of comparison with other members of society is economic or social status (Karl Marx would certainly have agreed with this logic). Donald Horowitz explains it differently in his book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 21-36. He draws a distinction between societies with ranked and unranked ethnic groups:

> ... stratification in ranked systems is synonymous with ethnic membership. Mobility opportunities are restricted by group identification (22).

[15] A nation defined as an "imagined political community" is the central theme found in Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, revised edition (New York: Verso, 1991).

[16] Political authorities often decide the distribution of scarce resources in a stratified society. Although they approach political authority from different perspectives, Leites and Wolf, Popkin, and Scott all discuss how a breakdown in the distribution process leads to social revolution.

[17] For detailed case studies of preferential public policies see *Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States*, edited by Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy (Boulder: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1986).

[18] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 186.

[19] Cynthia H. Enloe in *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973) states:

> There are several reasons why ethnic groups per se rarely become the bases of revolution. First, ethnicity is not primarily ideological or political; rather, it is cultural and social. Ethnic groups have enormous potential for political development, but politics remain secondary to other bonds and values shared by members. Second, in times of crisis ethnic communities are harder to expand than are ideological or functional associations ... Finally, by being more exclusive and having boundaries more visible, ethnic groups have a difficult time winning the confidence and trust of potential allies. Their objectives seem too parochial and their leadership too alien to excite active participation within the majority (222).

Although this is a compelling argument, I contend that the enormous potential she wrote about thirty years ago is today being mobilized for essentially parochial objectives.

[20] For a discussion of the related concept of *relative depravation*, see Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

[21] Samuel P. Huntington explains how social frustration because of inadequate institutions leads to political participation and ultimately political instability in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). I have taken some liberty to expand his arguments to include ethnic groups.

[22] As used in this paper, class is defined as a group of people sharing a common social, political, economic, and cultural characteristic consistent with their established position within a broadly defined societal norm.

[23] For a full explanation of the moral disengagement phenomena see Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of moral disengagement" in *Origins of Terror*, edited by Walter Reich (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161-191.

[24] Donald L. Horowitz has an excellent discussion of the idea of emulation and fear of extinction in *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 171-181

[25] The terms separatist, integrationist, and ethnocratist, along with many others, have been used in other publications but not in this combination. I chose this typology because I felt is was the most descriptive terminology.

[26] The use of political goals in this context refers to the political status of a nation-state, their sub-divisions, and political representation in governments. If we accept that political authority leads to economic authority, then achievement of political goals also secures economic objectives.

[27] Samuel P. Huntington outlines this distinction in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 78-92.

[28] See J. Philip Rogers, "Crisis Bargaining Codes and Crisis Management," in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

[29] For a detailed discussion of how misperception shapes leader behavior, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[30] This is not an exhaustive list of government actions. It is illustrative of the type of actions that some governments have employed over time based on a general survey of ethnic-based conflicts.

[31] Ethnic groups may also employ strategies of non-violence and civil disobedience to achieve their goals. This paper focuses on ethnic-based "resistance" movements that use armed violence to achieve their objectives. This limitation is intentional based on the case studies selected.

[32] According to Graham Smith, there were four main points to the Soviet policies towards the republics:

> 1. The Soviet federation denies the nationalities the right to national self-determination, with only a minimal degree of political maneuverability being granted to the local party-state machine in running the union republic. . . .
>
> 2. As a product of central policy, each of the non-Russian republics has developed a specialized, core-dependent economy . . . and concomitant specialized territorial division of labour. . . .

> 3. The upward mobility of natives within their union republic homelands has been aided by affirmative action policies which have contributed to the nativization of the local political leadership and to the growth of an indigenous middle class through preferential access to higher education and to party membership. . . .
>
> 4. Each of the non-Russian republics possesses a flourishing native culture and language aided by a variety of institutional supports provided as a consequence of their territorial status. Yet local cultures, while supported by the Soviet federation, have also been subjected to standardizing linguistic and cultural pressure from a Russian-dominated state.

Graham Smith, "The Soviet federation: from corporatist to crisis politics" in *Shared Space: Divided Space*, edited by Michael Chisholm and David M. Smith (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 85-86.

[33] Map source: Central Intelligence Agency, "Nicaragua," *World Factbook 2001*; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook; Internet; accessed January 2002.

[34] The anthropological divisions cited come from a distillation and compilation of the following works: James D. Rudolph, ed., *Nicaragua: a country study* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book 1992* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), and maps provided by Bernard Nietschmann to U.S. Congress, House, Task Force on Central America, Republican Study Committee, *Violence and Oppression in Nicaragua* (Washington, D.C.: The American Conservative Union, 1984).

[35] Demographic information was compiled from a combination of Central Intelligence Agency, *World Fact Book 1992* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992) and James D. Rudolph, ed., *Nicaragua: a country study* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982).

[36] Rudolph, xiv.

[37] See Rudolph, 63-101.

[38] See Rudolph, 92.

[39] See Rudolph, 3-27.

[40] The importance of history to understanding contemporary issues is addressed by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

[41] While some of this analysis is speculative based on historical evidence, counterrevolutionary events appear to have validated the suppositions. In general, there are very few instances where an ethnic group actually definitely identifies the root causes of their racial dislike for another group. Mostly, it is just perceived reality. Then again, perceptions can be reality.

[42] See U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas: From Revolution to Repression* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 60.

[43] For a detailed description of the Sandinistas' Marxist ideology see David Nolan, *The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Coral Gables, FL: Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami, 1988).

[44] See U.S. Department of State, Human Rights. . ., 60.

[45] See Rudolph, 91.

[46.] See U.S. Department of State, Human Rights. . ., 60.

[47] The reason for integration is obvious:

> The concerted effort to integrate the Atlantic Coast region into mainstream Nicaraguan life was, in large part, a recognition that this vast, underpopulated region could serve - as it had in the past - as a staging area for counterrevolution. Traditionally isolated from the heartland of Nicaragua in the largely mestizo Pacific region, the residents of the Atlantic Coast, about half of whom are Miskito Indians who had played virtually no role in the struggle to overthrow Somoza, were initially wary of the new government (Rudolph, xxvi).

[48] ALPROMISU is an acronym for Alliance for the Progress of Miskitos and Sumos.

[49] MISURASATA is an acronym for Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity.

[50] See Rudolph, 162-164.

[51] See Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 298.

[52] See U.S. Department of State, *Dispossessed: the Miskito Indians in Sandinista Nicaragua* (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1986), 3.

[53] This new organization was still Indian-based but dropped the Sandinistas from the name and orientation.

[54] See Christian, 300-301.

[55] See Glenn Garvin, *Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA & the Contras* (New York: Brassey's, 1992), 17.

[56] In some cases the elders were simply killed. See Garvin, 19.

[57] A complete discussion of societal stratification is found in Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 22 and 186-196).

[58] See Rudolph, 92-93.

[59] See Rudolph, 105-130.

[60] Horowitz, 171-181.

[61] See Congress, House, Republican Study Committee, *Violence and Oppression in Nicaragua: Hearing Before the Task Force on Central America*, 28 June 1984, 73-78; and Rudolph, 168.

[62] FDN is an acronym for Nicaraguan Democratic Force.

[63] See Rudolph, 174.

[64] ARDE is an acronym for Democratic Revolutionary Alliance.

[65] Although the term self-determination has become a clique for any national movement, this is exactly what the Indian and Creole freedom-fighters hoped to return to.

[66] For excellent discussions of the politics of dominance see Horowitz, and Richard M. Burkey, *Ethnic & Rachial Groups: The Dynamics of Dominance* (Menlo Park, CA: Cummings Publishing Company, 1978).

[67] Government militias were lightly armed groups of locals recruited by the Sandinistas to maintain order as required. In actuality, they were ill-trained and ill-led. For all intents and purposes they were merely armed gangs that were loosely accountable to the central government.

[68] See Human Rights. . ., 60-64; C.P.D.H. *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua* (New York: Puebla Institute, 1987); Nina H. Shea, "Testimony for Nicaraguan Refugees," *Nicaragua in Focus*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Joseph E. Davis, ed. (New York: Puebla Institute, 1987), 16-23; and Congress, Senate, Republican Policy Committee, *Turmoil in Central America* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), 45-53.

[69] "The Malaysian Solution" was a British strategy used during the crisis in that country. Chinese ethnic minorities were moved into "strategic hamlets" to control Chinese insurgent guerilla access to them. Richard Stubbs, The Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malaysian Emergency 1948 – 1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[70] See U.S Department of State, *Dispossessed*. . ., 3-4; Congress, Senate, Turmoil. . ., 60-61.

[71] See Jiri and Virginia Valenta, *"The FSLN in Power,"* Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional Perspective, edited by Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 20-21.

[72] See Garvin, 68.

[73] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Bloc Military Equipment Supplied to Nicaragua (Jul 1979 – Dec 1988)* Report February 1989 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense).

[74] U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Central American Peace Prospects: U.S. Interests and Response (January 19, 1989)*, by Nina M. Serafino, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB87200 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 1989) 8 - 9.

[75] U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Staff, *Contra Aid: Summary and Chronology of Major Congressional Action 1981 – 1989 (November 1, 1989)*, by Nina M. Serafino and Maureen Taft-Morales, Congressional Research Service Brief 89-611 F (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, 1989).

[76] On May 9, 1984, Ronald Reagan delivered a speech to the nation appealing for support to the Contras in order to combat Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan aggression in Latin America. This was basically a Cold War appeal to contain spreading communism invoking the Monroe doctrine.

[77] U.S. Congress. Senate, Committe on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua: Aid to Nicaraguan Resistance Proposal,* 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 27 February and 4 March 1986.

[78] Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, *The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 161 – 162.

[79] As outlined in Serafino and Taft-Morales' report *Contra Aid...*, the chronology of Congressional actions is listed below:

1981: Congress approves program of covert Contra aid

1982: Congress restricts purpose of covert Contra funding with the first "Boland Amendment"

1983: Congress openly provides Contra aid, but caps spending

1984: Congress cuts off Contra aid, adopts the so-called "Boland Amendment" spending restrictions, and provides for possible resumption of aid

1985: Congress resumes aid for non-lethal humanitarian purposes

1986: Congress resumes military aid to the Contras

1987: Congress considers moratorium, provides only non-lethal aid

1988: Congress refuses Presidential request for military aid, provides "humanitarian" non-lethal aid

1989: Bi-partisan agreement provides non-lethal aid

[80] Miranda and Ratliff, 162.

[81] Map source: Central Intelligence Agency, "Yugoslavia," *World Factbook 2001*; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook; Internet; accessed January 2002.

[82] Kosovar is the common term used for the Albanian ethnic group living in Kosovo.

[83] The primary basis for this information is derived from the 1991 Census. Although there was general boycott by the Kosovar Albanians of the census and the numbers may be skewed, no other sources exist. Demographic information for Yugoslavia was compiled from a combination of Central Intelligence Agency, "Yugoslavia"... and *Microsoft Encarta Reference Library 2002,* Version 11.0.0.0809, s.v. "Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of."

[84] The primary basis for this information is again derived from the 1991 Census. Demographic information for Kosovo was compiled from a combination of Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999), and the UN sponsored source Humanitarian Community Information Centre, "Kosovo Encyclopedia II," available from http://www.reliefweb.int/hcic; Internet; accessed March 2002.

[85] Language information is derived from the Central Intelligence Agency, *Microsoft Encarta Reference Library 2002*, and Malcolm.

[86] Religious information is derived from the Central Intelligence Agency, *Microsoft Encarta Reference Library 2002*, and Malcolm. The small number of Albanians who are Serb Orthodox is an interesting anomaly and probably reflects their attempts to survive and assimilate into a Serb dominated population.

[87] Malcolm writes:

> The importance of the Kanun to the ordinary life of the Albanians of Kosovo...can hardly be exaggerated...(18)
>
> One leading scholar has summed up the basic principles of the Kanun as follows. The foundation of it all is the principle of personal honour. Next comes the equality of the persons. From these flows a third principle, the freedom of each to act in accordance with his own honour, within the limits of the law, without being subject to another's command. And the fourth principle is the word of honor...which creates a situation of inviolable trust (18).

[88] Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 29 – 48.

[89] Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Kosovo: As Seen, As Told," available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/asat1/ch1.htm; Internet; accessed January 2002.

[90] This distinction is not trivial. It is the key concept that divides national identity and nationalism from ethnic identity. Eriksen discusses this elemental distinction in detail. Thomas H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (Boulder, CO: Pluto Press, 1993).

[91] OSCE, "Kosovo: As Seen, As Told."

[92] OSCE, "Kosovo: As Seen, As Told."

[93] U.S. Department of State, "Kosovo Chronology," 21 May 1999; available from http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_kosovo_timeline.html; Internet; accessed January 2002.

[94] *Microsoft Encarta Reference Library 2002*, Version 11.0.0.0809, s.v. "Yugoslav Succession, Wars of.

[95] The initial armed conflict in Slovenia was relatively short-lived while the fight for control of Croatia lasted six months. Remarkably, Macedonia (now know as the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia or FYROM in deference to Greek sensibilities) managed to secede from Yugoslavia without violence.

[96] The conflict between Serbs and Bosniacs in Bosnia-Herzegovina was concluded diplomatically with The Dayton Peace Agreement. This agreement was initialed by representatives of both sides at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995 and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Two important facts from this agreement are relevant to the subsequent conflict in Kosovo. Slobodan Milosevic represented the Serb side in the negotiations over the status of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzogovina. Second, while "inter-entity boundary lines and related issues" were included, Kosovo was pointedly absent from the agreement. U.S. Department of State, "Dayton Peace Accords," available from http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html; Internet; accessed January 2002.

[97] U.S. Department of State, "Rambouillet Agreement," available from http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html; Internet; accessed January 2002.

[98] Federation of American Scientists, "Operation Allied Force," available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/allied_force.htm; Internet; accessed January 2002.

[99] This list of Serb government actions has many sources such as U.S. State Department documents, U.S. Congressional hearings, United Nations documents, NATO, and other interest groups. The most succinct but not exhaustive source is Noel Malcolm.

[100] Malcolm, 323.

[101] Malcolm, 326.

[102] The strength of myths and the powerful mobilizing effect they have on people is beautifully expressed in Bill Moyer's series of interviews with Joseph Campbell. Joseph Campbell, *The Power of Myth*, Betty Sue Flowers, ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1998).

[103] Kaplan's argument in *Balkan Ghosts* is persuasive. He draws his interpretation from two sources. One is an epic Serbian poem (Kosovo Polje, the Field of Black Birds), 37. The other is an unattributed quote:

> Why should these Muslim foreigners, who came only 300 years ago to Old Serbia, the historic heartland of our nation, have autonomy here? Never! (39).

[104]Beginning with the important point that both Serbs and Albanians fought on the same side against the Turks at the Battle of Kosovo, Noel Malcolm is quick to dismiss Kaplan's argument. He convincingly argues that Serbian use of the Battle of Kosovo is a 19th Century construct originally intended to promote Serbian nationalism rather than Serbian superiority. Malcolm, xxix and 58 – 80.

[105] OSCE, "Kosovo: As Seen, As Told."

[106] Malcolm, XXX

[107] Malcom, 346 – 347 and OSCE, "Kosovo: As Seen, As Told."

[108] Malcolm, 348.

[109] *Microsoft Encarta Reference Library 2002,* s.v. "Yugoslav Succession, Wars of."

[110] Malcom, XXX

[111] Malcolm, 348.

[112] Malcolm, 355

[113] Malcolm, i.

> In late 1997 and early 1998 sporadic acts of armed revolt by Albanians met with severe and sometimes indiscriminate responses from the Serb security forces; the Serbian policy stimulated the growth of the 'Kosovo Liberation Army', the existence of which formed the pretext for Serbian campaign of destruction against Albanian villages in the summer of 1998.

[114] "Operation 'Horseshoe' (Potkova)," available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/op-horsehoe.htm; Internet; accessed January 2002 and Malcolm, Preface.

[115] U.S. Congress, Commission on the Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Repression and Violence in Kosovo and Kosovo: the Humanitarian Perspective,* 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., 18 March 1998 and 25 June 1998, CSCE Doc. 105-2-1 and 106-2-2.; U.S. Congress, Commission on the Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Atrocities and the Humanitarian Crisis in Kosovo,* 105th Cong,, 2nd Sess., 6 April 1999, CSCE Doc. 106-1-4; and U.S. Congress, Commission on the Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Atrocities in Kosovo*, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., 6 May 1999, CSCE Doc. 105-2-4.

[116] U.S. Department of State, "U.S. and NATO Objectives and Interests in Kosovo," 26 March 1999, available from http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990326_ksvobjectives.html; Internet; accessed January 2002.

[117] Important and humanitarian interests as defined in William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, DC: The White House, October 1998), 1-2.

[118] Woodrow Wilson, "Fourteen Points," Speech to Congress, 8 January 1918 Washington, DC: 1918).

[119] William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy Of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 1996).

[120] As with any normative ideal, "democratic enlargement" suffers from a lack of consensus and common definition on the exact meaning of democracy. This can lead to confused interpretations and policy decisions.

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